Introduction
"The ways municipal audit services are procured are often substandard. It's as if a firm, when recruiting personnel, would always hire the applicant who will take a minimum wage, without even first conducting some job interviews." (Haglund and Brunström, 2012) [author's translation] The quote is from an article by Anders Haglund and PerÅke Brunström, both partners and certified professional local government auditors, in which they criticize the procurement of municipal audit services in Sweden. "In most procurement of audit services," they write, "the price is the only and decisive evaluation criterion."
Although there are legal and institutional differences between countries, previous studies on procurement of municipal audit services in U.S. municipalities (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1987) indicate that this is not a problem unique to Sweden. According to the U.S.
General Accounting Office (now the Governmental Accountability Office) the complexity of municipal and governmental audits, usually requires solicitation methods using other factors than price, where audit contract is awarded the lowest bidder (ibid.). Their framework for procuring audit services includes four critical attributes; competition, solicitation, technical evaluation and written agreement. They also advocate competitive negotiation as preferred method of procuring audit services. However, this method increases the cost of thinking (cf. Collin et al., 2009 ) and may also, depending on pronouncement regulation, increase the risk of appeals.
In view of the abolition of the Audit Commission in England (Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle, 2012) , there might be lessons to be learned from Sweden where the professional audit services are procured on the audit market by the municipalities themselves.
The aim of this study is to identify the extent to which price is the determining factor in the procurement of audit services and examine the extent to which competition among audit firms as well as political competition among political parties affect municipalities' probability of choosing professional auditors based on criteria other than price. Even if the aim of this study is not to analyze audit quality, it may be worthwhile to recall that according to the U.S.
General Accounting Office (1987) , there is a relationship between the process used to procure audit services and the compliance with professional standards and contractual terms set out for the audit, e.g. audit quality.
Institutional and legal settings
Even though the obligations and duties of municipalities are regulated by law, Swedish municipalities are, by law and tradition, relatively autonomous from central government. The municipalities have the right to levy their own taxes and they decide largely themselves how operations are carried out and financed (e.g. Mattisson et al. 2003 and Argento et al, 2010) . This decentralization and independence from central government is also reflected in the municipal audit regulation. In Sweden, the city council appoints five [political] auditors, i.e. politically engaged citizens who are active members of a political party but without any formal training in audit, and whose task is to audit the municipal board, (e.g. Cassel, 2000; SALAR, 2010; Tagesson and Eriksson, 2011) . According to the Municipal Act, the duties of the auditors are to inspect whether the activities have been carried out in an appropriate and financially satisfactory way, whether the accounts are true and fair, and whether the internal control within the committees are sufficient. Thus, the audit includes both value for money audit as well as audit of the financial reports. In order to secure the auditing process with regard to professional knowledge, the [political] auditors are to be assisted by the experts [professional auditors] in their inspection (ibid.). For the professional auditors, this means that the requirements of independence and responsibility differ significantly compared to when they are the appointed auditors of a company in the sense that they are only accountable to their clients, e.g. the political auditors, and not subject to any professional oversight (Cassel, 2000; Tagesson and Eriksson, 2011) .
If the professional auditors are hired from the external audit firms, procurement must be made in accordance with the Public Procurement Act (2007 Act ( :1091 . The Act normally requires a description of the assignment and a specification of requirements. Evaluation of submitted tenders must be made objectively, and the audit firm that most satisfactorily meets the requirements is awarded the assignment. Some of the evaluation criteria that the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR) addresses are expertise, education, price, reputation, specialization, and experience. These factors should then be prioritized, scored, and weighted against each other to get to a satisfactory evaluation of the tenders (SALAR, 2001) .
Theory
As the aim of the study is to describe and explain a phenomenon, procurement of audit services, we have used an eclectic and deductive approach (c.f. Collin et al, 2009) . Thus both economic and institutional arguments are used in order to derive hypotheses which are then tested statistically (ibid.).
Price
Our main hypothesis is that municipalities primarily choose the audit firm with the lowest price. Criteria that are objective and easy to evaluate reduce the risk of appeals. An appeal not only creates uncertainty, but can also lead to delays and increased costs. This reasoning leads to our main hypothesis:
H1: Municipalities usually choose professional auditors from the audit firm with the lowest price.
Political competition
When political competition is strong, the requirement of monitoring increases (Zimmerman, 1977; Baber, 1983) . This is partly because the opposition wants to monitor the majority (Zimmerman, 1977) but also that the majority wants to signal to voters and other stakeholders that they are responsible in their actions (Copley et al., 1995) . However, from a Swedish context, it is not just about competition between different majorities. Given that Sweden has a multiple winner voting system, there can also be strong competition within the ruling coalition. According to Copley et al. (1995) , municipalities where there is strong political competition tend to choose audit firms with a good reputation. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H2: The likelihood that municipalities choose professional auditors based on criteria other than price increases when political competition is strong.
Political governance (majority)
Municipalities are political organizations, and politicians must therefore consider the voters in their quest to get re-elected (Downs, 1957; Zimmerman, 1977; Copley et. al., 1995 , Tagesson et al., 2013 . Different parties have different ideologies which can create different expectations among voters regarding how they relate, for example, to market pricing and competition. The political regime can therefore be expected to affect how municipalities act on the issue of procurement of audit services. This leads to the hypothesis that:
H3: There is a relationship between political governance and the probability of choosing professional auditors based on criteria other than price.
Number of tenders
Competition and market share in the municipal audit market as well as competition and market share in the rest of the audit market can also affect audit firms' actions and bids. It is profitable for audit firm to retain clients year after year (DeAngelo, 1981; Deis and Giroux, 1992; Johnson 2001) . Change of auditors may initially also increase costs for the client.
However, in a competitive market, audit firms may lowball in order get new clients and gain a larger share of the market, while the current audit firm has a strong incentive to lower its price in order to keep the assignment. A large percentage of the initial commitments that were found in Johnson's (2001) study used this lowball strategy. Consequently, high competition increases the probability that an audit firm with a good reputation and high competence will bid a low price in its tender. This leads to the hypothesis that:
H4a: The likelihood that municipalities choose professional auditors based on criteria other than price decreases with the number of tenders.
On the other hand, one can also argue that in a situation with high competition among audit firms, the supply of services is greater than the demand, which will lead to lower prices. Since prices in a competitive situation normally are pushed downwards, the buyer can emphasize and concentrate on criteria other than price. This leads to the hypothesis that:
H4b: The likelihood that municipalities choose professional auditors based on criteria other than price increases with the number of tenders.
Audit firm
Many companies choose to hire a specialized firm to avoid errors, improve efficiency, and achieve a higher audit quality (Dunn and Mayhew, 2004) . Palmrose (1986) believes that fees may be higher when auditors become more specialized. There are several factors indicating specialization. According to Balsam, Kirshnan and Yang (2003) , the most important factor is knowledge, but this is difficult to measure. Other important factors indicating firm specialization are market share, number and size of clients (Balsam et al., 2003) , and the fact that the audit firm is market leader in an industry (Palmrose, 1986) . When choosing the audit firm, reputation plays an indirect role. When an audit firm is well known for high quality and specialization, this contributes to improving the likelihood that the audit firm gets the audit assignment (Hogan & Jeter, 1999) . Thus, specialization is often used as a proxy for audit quality since it is easier and less costly to evaluate than audit quality (e.g. DeAngelo, 1981).
In 1996, PwC acquired Komrev (an audit firm specialized in municipal audit) from SALAR.
This acquisition gave PwC a large market share and employees with extensive municipal experience and specialization. Consequently, factors like reputation and specialization influence the choice of audit firm. This leads to hypothesis that:
H5: There is a connection between the chosen audit firm and the probability of choosing professional auditors based on criteria other than price.
Method

Selection of data
The empirical data of the study are based on (i) document studies and (ii) statistics from Statistics Sweden and the Election Authority. All the documents are from the latest procurement, and the data from Statistics Sweden's database refer to the year 2010. At the time of the study, after a few financially strong years, the municipal sector expected deteriorating income and difficult times (SALAR, 2008) . However, due to various circumstances, e.g. temporary reimbursements from the over-capitalized insurance scheme, the financial outcome turned out better than expected.
A total of 189 of the 289 Swedish municipalities are included in the study. Twelve municipalities were excluded because they procured their audit services directly without tendering, on the grounds that the amount was below the legal requirements for public procurement. An additional 11 municipalities were excluded from the sample because the audit services are carried out by officials at their own audit office. In the remaining 77 cases, the data loss is attributable to the fact that the respondents did not submit the required procurement documents to us. However, when comparing the municipalities included in the study with those not included in the sample by tax capacity, net operating costs, and political majority, we did not find any significant difference between the groups.
Operationalization
-The dependent variable is a dummy variable where 1 means that the audit firm with the lowest price in its tender got the assignment, otherwise 0. (data source: documents from the municipalities).
-Political competition was measured in three ways. The first variable is a dummy variable where 1 means that there was a change (= more competition) in the last election regarding the ruling party/parties, otherwise 0 (data source: Statistics Sweden). The second variable is a dummy variable where 1 means that the municipality is governed by a majority and 0 means that the municipality is governed by a minority (= more competition) (data source: Statistics Sweden). The third variable, the Herfindahl index, was calculated for each municipality by squaring and summing each party's share of votes in the latest election (Theil, 1972; Tagesson, 2002; Hanspers and Hensvik, 2010) . Thus, the Herfindahl index can assume a value between 0 and 1. The closer to 1, the higher the harmonization -in this context interpreted as low competition -and vice versa (data source: the Election Authority).
-Political governance determines which of three groups a municipality is be classified into: (i) Social Democrats and the left-wing party, (ii) Conservatives and Liberals, or (iii) municipalities with indistinct political governance. Political governance is then transformed into three dummy variables. Municipalities in class (i) are used as a reference variable (data source: Statistics Sweden). (The number of dummy variables needed in the analysis is always one less than the number of categories. The included categories are interpreted in relation to the omitted category, e.g. the reference variable.
-Number of tenders is based on the information in the documents we received from the municipalities.
-Audit firm is based on the information in the documents we received from the municipalities. Only Big 4 audit firms had won municipal procurements of audit services. The four audit firms -PwC, EY, KPMG, Deloitte -are encoded into four dummy variables. PWC is used as reference variable.
As control variables, we use tax base and net operating cost. Tax base is measured as the sum of all inhabitants' income and benefits, divided by the number of inhabitants. Citizens' interest in municipal decisions can be explained by their income level (Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie, 1993) and economic input (Jensen & Payne, 2005) . Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the demand and interest for audit increases with increased tax base.
Net operating cost can be seen as a proxy for the size and complexity of the audit assignment (cf. Tagesson et al., 2013) . Hence, both control variables are expected to be negatively correlated with the dependent variable, i.e. probability of choosing professional auditors based on criteria other than price should increase with increased tax base and increased net operating costs (data source: Statistics Sweden).
Analysis
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 ____________________________ Insert Table 1 , 72% of the municipalities gave the assignment to the audit firm that offered the lowest price in its tender. The three variables designed to measure political competition indicate that there are differences among the municipalities regarding political stability. In 31% of the municipalities, there was a change regarding the ruling party/parties in the last election, with 13% of the municipalities being governed by minority rule. The Conservatives and Liberals govern 46% of the municipalities, while the Social Democrats and the left-wing party govern 38%. The remaining 16% of the municipalities were classified as indistinct political governance. On average, there were 2.81 tenders for each assignment. All tenders were won by one of the Big Four firms: PwC dominated with 50% of the assignments; KPMG had 25%, closely followed by EY with 18%; Deloitte had the lowest market share with 7%. Table 2 , EY and PwC more often, than Deloitte and KPMG, won tenders despite their price not being the lowest. Deloitte did not win any procurement where their tender was above the lowest price. In 85% of cases in which KPMG won the procurement, they also offered the lowest price in their tender.
____________________________
Insert Table 3 about here ____________________________ As shown in Table 3 , political governance per se does not seem to influence whether the municipalities have a tendency to choose audit services based on lowest price or not.
Insert Table 4 about here ____________________________ Table 4 shows that, as assumed, the two control variables (tax base and net operating cost) are significantly negatively correlated with the dependent variable. Furthermore, the Herfindahl index is positively correlated with the dependent variable, which means that when political competition is low the likelihood increases that the municipality gives the audit assignment to the audit firm with the lowest price offer. The number of tenders is negatively correlated with the dependent variable, which means that the probability that the municipality chooses the audit firm based on criteria other than price increases if several audit firms are bidding. Furthermore, the correlation matrix shows that Deloitte and KPMG both differ significantly from PwC regarding the probability of winning audit assignments on criteria other than price; there is no significant difference between PwC and EY in this matter.
However, it seems that EY essentially wins tenders in municipalities with conservative and liberal governance and high tax bases. None of the variables of political governance are significant. However, both variables for political governance are significantly correlated with the Hefindahl index, which may indicate that these variables have a reciprocal moderating effect on each other (cf. Barkman and Djurfeldt, 2009) . Although the various dependent variables to some extent correlate with each other, a complementary collinearity test shows that all VIF values are between 1.094 and 2.079, which is well below the critical value of the VIF-factor = 2.5 (Djurfeldt, Larsson and Stjärnhagen, 2010) . (VIF shows how the variance of an estimator is inflated by the presence of multicollinearity, i.e. the extent to which the independent variables are mutually correlated) Possibly, the correlation of 0.525 between the two control variables signals a collinearity problem.
Insert Table 5 In Model 2, we exclude the variable net operating cost, because of suspected collinearity problem with the tax base variable. The result of the analysis is basically the same as in Model 1 except for the difference that the Herfindahl index (positively) and tax base variable (negatively) are significantly correlated with the dependent variable, suggesting that political competition and higher tax base increase the probability of choosing auditors based on criteria other than price.
The fact that the Conservative and Liberal governance variable differs significantly from the reference variable in both Models 1 and 2 but not in the correlation matrix strengthens our suspicion that the variables for political governance and the Hefindahl index have a reciprocal moderating effect on each other (cf. Barkman and Djurfeldt, 2009 ).
We therefore ran two more models: one where we removed the Herfindahl index and one where we included it, but the variables for political governance were excluded in both those models. Model 3 shows the regression model, where the Herfindahl index was excluded.
Apparently, the number of tenders, KPMG and tax base variables are still significantly correlated with the dependent variable; however, the Conservative and Liberal governance variable is no longer significantly correlated with the dependent variable. In the regression model, where we included the Hefindahl index but excluded the variables for political governance, the Hefindahl index was no longer significantly correlated with the dependent variable. This suggests that it is not political governance per se or political competition in general, but competition between the political parties within the Conservative and Liberal coalition, that influence the procurement of audit services. In order to further test this, we ran a fourth regression model in which we merged the Hefindahl index with the variables for political governance. To refine the analysis, we also excluded the other two variables for political competition. The regression model is shown in Table 6 .
Insert Table 6 about here ____________________________ As shown in Table 6 , the merged variable for Conservative and Liberal governance and the Herfindahl index is significant and positively correlated with the dependent variable. The variable number of tenders is still significant and negatively correlated with the dependent variable, while the variable for KPMG is significant and positively correlated. Also the control variable, tax base, is significant and negatively correlated with the dependent variable in this model.
Interpretation and hypothesis testing
The study shows that 72% of the municipalities chose to give the audit service assignment to the audit firm that offered the lowest price in its tender. Thus, assuming that municipalities usually choose professional auditors from the audit firm with the lowest price, Hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected.
The two variables, change in the last election and minority governance, do not show any significant correlation with the dependent variable. However, the Herfindahl index is significantly and positively correlated with the dependent variable in the correlation matrix and also in the regression analyses that considered political governance. The interpretation of this is that competition among the political blocs does not influence whether municipalities choose professional auditors on the basis of price or not. However, the results suggests that weak competition within the political blocs increases the probability of choosing professional auditors from the firm with the lowest price, at least if the municipality is governed by Conservatives and Liberals. Hence, we can only partially reject Hypothesis 2, which predicts that the likelihood that municipalities choose professional auditors based on criteria other than price increases with strong political competition.
Political governance itself does not seem to affect the probability of whether municipalities choose professional auditors from the firm that offers the lowest price or not. However, as previously mentioned, the probability of choosing professional auditors from the audit firm that offers lowest price increases if municipalities are governed by Conservatives and Liberals with a domination of a few parties Thus, Hypothesis 3, which assumes a relationship between political governance and the probability of choosing professional auditors based on criteria other than price, is only partially rejected.
The analyses show that the variable number of tenders is significantly and negatively correlated with the dependent variable, which means that the probability that the municipality chooses professional auditors based on criteria other than price increases if tenders are received from several audit firms. Hypothesis 4a, that the likelihood that municipalities choose professional auditors based on criteria other than price decreases with the number of tenders, can therefore be rejected; while Hypothesis 4b, that the likelihood that municipalities choose professional auditors based on criteria other than price increases with the number of tenders cannot be rejected.
The analyses also show that there are differences among the audit firms. The probability that municipalities choose professional auditors based on criteria other than price is more likely when PwC or EY get the audit assignment than in situations when KPMG or Deloitte get the audit assignment. Hypothesis 5, that there is a connection between audit firm and the probability of choosing professional auditors based on criteria other than price cannot be rejected.
Conclusions and discussion
The study shows that 72% of the municipalities included in the study chose professional auditors from the audit firm that offered the lowest price. One possible explanation for this finding might be that municipalities want to avoid the risk of violating the Public Procurement Act (2007:1091). However, even if the legislation allows criteria other than price to be a predominant factor in weighting of the tenders, these other criteria can be quite subjective and difficult to evaluate. Price, on the other hand, is perceived as objective and simple to evaluate.
Thus, if price is the predominant criterion, it reduces the risk of appeals.
The study indicates that competition among the political blocs does not seem to influence the probability that price affects the choice of professional auditors. However, the regression model in table 6 shows that if competition is weak within the political blocs, municipalities with Conservative and Liberal governance tend to choose professional auditors based on price to a greater extent than municipalities governed by the Social Democrats and the left-wing party. This may indicate that the audit has an important function when majorities are to be formed on the basis of political coalitions.
The correlation matrix also shows that EY essentially win tenders in municipalities with Conservative and Liberal governance and high tax base. Whether this is an effect of the political regime or whether it is attributable to where in the country EY and the other audit firms have specialists working with municipal matters is also an issue for further studies.
However, the question is important, as this study shows that an increased number of tenders also reduce the probability that municipalities choose professional auditors based on price.
Paradoxically, increased competition reduces the probability that the price will be the determining factor in the procurement of professional audit services. One possible explanation is that with more tenders to choose from, the municipalities can focus on criteria other than price. Another possible explanation is that if the competition is intense, the specialized and established audit firms will also lower their prices in order to meet lowballing competitors (cf. Johnson, 2001 ). The significant differences among audit firms suggest that the strategy of lowballing exists at the Swedish municipal audit market.
Implications
The Swedish experience shows that when municipalities themselves procure audit services in the open market the price will, in most cases, be the determining factor. Especially when the number of tenders are few. A concern in this regard is that in the Swedish municipal audit market -where the municipalities procure the professional audit services themselves -is The results also raise some questions and normative implications regarding the procurement process and its regulation. When municipalities procure audit services in an open and concentrated audit market, a specific regulation of the procurement process of audit services should be considered in order to ensure sufficient number of tenders. The study indicates that sufficient number of tenders enables a balanced trade-off between expertise, education, price, specialization, experience etc. in the procurement of audit services which is likely to have a positive impact on audit quality. A detailed design of such regulation is beyond the scope of this paper, but experience from the United States suggests some form competitive negotiation (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1987 Yes (1) No (0) 58 (31 %)
131 (69 %)
Minority (MG)
Yes (1) No (0) 24 ( Net operating cost in billion SEK ***Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
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** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed).
